Over several thousand years population densities drifted upward, increasing six-fold to 14 inh. Millennia passed, and the agricultural "revolution" continued, but at a pace thousands of years slower than in the Middle East. Diffusion was a multi-millennial process in Mesoamerica, slowed by the fact that expansion was along the more challenging south-north axis rather than east-west. Mesoamerican corn and other cultigens ultimately adapted both to varying day-length as well as climate necessitated for longitudinal diffussion, but this required many centuries of experience and experiment.
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Demographic conditions scarcely improved with the agricultural "revolution. Change occurred in "jumps and spurts" and with many false starts. As irrigation technique and practice evolved BP population growth slowly accelerated and densities expanded, from 43 inhabitants per km2 BP to BP and 1, BP. In the final phase years ago , in the eight centuries preceding contact with Europeans, population densities multiplied three-fold to some 3, inh. The greatest success in Mesoamerica in terms of demographic density is found in the Central Mexican Basin. From a study of more than 3, habitation sites William T.
Sanders and his coworkers pieced together an astonishing series of population estimates stretching over three millennia. Figure 1 depicts the long-term evolution of population sizes in the Mexican basin. To take into account error and uncertainties, smoothed curves at fifty and one hundred fifty percent bracket their point estimates. The figure is scaled logarithmically—as are most figures in this essay—to suggest relative growth and decline for each period. The graph shows the population of the Valley of Mexico expanding from fewer than 5, inhabitants 3, years ago to some Region-wide decline is explained sometimes by exogenous factors—a cooling climate or severe seismic activity—and at others by endogenous developments or lack thereof, such as population pressure, economic decay, or political disintegration.
If we discount the most recent and as yet incomplete phase, the graph exhibits three growth cycles at intervals of roughly one thousand years—occurring , , and years ago. Figure 1 shows that this region has had only one demographic revolution and it occurred in the twentieth-century, when the annual baby crop topped two million and growth peaked at almost three percent. This revolution is already winding down. By the middle of the next millennium, twentieth-century growth may come to resemble one of the demographic swells of the paleolithic past.
Regional variations show how difficult it was to win the demographic lottery in ancient Mesoamerica. The many "disappearances" of ancient civilizations have provoked much speculation about causes. The pioneering bioarchaeologist Frank Saul suggests that we may be asking the wrong question about the decline of Mesoamerican cities, cultures or peoples. Saul argues that the question should be "not why they declined, but rather, how they managed to survive for so long.
The old notion of strong, robust, healthy populations in Mesoamerica—a pre-Columbian paradise—is poorly supported by settlement patterns and the skeletal evidence. Ethnohistorical interpretations highlight success stories, but ethnohistorical sources still await skeptical, demographically informed scrutiny. Physical and physiological stress seems ubiquitous in Mesoamerica, although somewhat less so than among most peoples in northern North America.
High rates of healed fractures, severe dental wear, and advanced osteophytosis are common in the earliest extant skeletal material. Tuberculosis and treponemal infection, forms of syphilis and yaws, date from 3, BP. Also common are coral-like lesions on the crania porotic hyperostosis and cribra orbitalia , severe physiological responses to acute or chronic anemia resulting from nutritional deficiencies, extreme parasitic infestation, debilitating infection, blood loss or some combination of these.
A tally of adult Mesoamerican skeletons from the Health and Nutrition in the Americas database reveals women with higher rates of facial fractures than men gender abuse? The lesson learned from these skeletons is that where the human body was the principal mechanism for growing food, constructing buildings and moving heavy burdens the biological price was great.
Hard, repetitive work exacted severe wear on Mesoamerican bodies of both sexes, particularly joints required for mobility, manipulation of objects, or bearing loads. As populations became more sedentary, diarrhea, typhus, and region-wide famine probably became more common. With the spread of a monotonous diet of squash, corn and beans, stature declined, at least for males. Shortening stature was an adaptive response to malnutrition, undernutrition and concomitant disease levels, resulting from the adoption of a settled, neolithic way of life.
These were the primary causes of regional and temporal differentials in stature. Males in the north, subsisting from hunting and gathering, averaged cm with little decline over time. In the center, average stature for men in the classic period fell to cm. Southward from Oaxaca, the average adult male stood at cm, although along the coasts heights were greater. Female stature, averaging cm, is more perplexing because there was little systematic variation in space or time. Paleodemography corroborates the findings of paleopathology.
Extraordinarily low life expectancy was the rule for Mesoamerican populations. Paleodemographers favor life expectancy at birth as the measure of choice, but this indicator should be discounted because only extraordinary burial practices and exceptionally thorough archaeological recovery techniques yield representative samples. The ethnohistorian Ortiz de Montellano puts life expectancy at birth for the Aztec at 37 years, but the cited source does not, in fact, support this figure.
A decidedly somber picture emerges when we examine life expectancies at older ages see Table 1. At age 15 e 15 , Mesoamerican life expectancies were extremely low, ranging from 13 to 29 additional years of life. In other words, for those surviving to age 15, death came around age 28 through 44 on average. Non-quantitative sources support the interpretation that mortality was extremely high in Mesoamerica. The Nahua Aztec sculpted high morbidity in stone and structured high mortality in their language.
Consider the vast Nahua pantheon to beg for divine succor from a great diversity of afflictions and illnesses. Nahuatl grammar is obsessed, indeed burdened, with mortality. Why encumber the language with a grammatical suffix indicating whether kin are dead or alive unless mortality is an ever-present concern? Extrapolating paleodemographic estimates for Mesoamerican populations points to life expectancies at birth of years, or annual crude birth rates as high as 67 or as low as Since on the whole these paleopopulations were growing, the upper bound of the crude birth rate should be set a few points higher, at say, births per thousand population.
Students of modern populations would dismiss the upper range as impossible. Nevertheless, a simple experiment reveals that a stable population with a crude birth rate of 70 and a growth rate of 0. This is an astonishingly high figure, yet as recently as , Mexican women with no schooling who survived to menopause averaged 7. This average was attained even though marriage was delayed to around age 20 and not all women formed stable unions.
If we look back into the nineteenth-century we find women attaining this record, or nearly so. Even with life expectancy at birth e 0 as low as 16 years, a high-fertility paleopopulation could sustain a growth rate of 0. To reach an 8. Since menopause sets in around age 40 or 45, girls would have had to marry close to the age of puberty, at say 15 years. This is exactly what we find in the earliest extant documentary evidence for the Aztecs. Child marriage, involving cohabitation, was common in ancient Mexico. The custom of child marriage among the indigenes surprised Europeans.
In "natural fertility" populations weaning facilitates ovulation and conception—when not actually precipitated by the birth of a second baby to be suckled. In the s and s, for rural Nahuas in Huitzillan and Quauhchichinollan located in the modern state of Morelos average age at marriage defined as co-residing couples is estimated at Data for this population of 2, ordinary folk reflect authentically indigenous practices because the Christian spiritual conquest had scarcely begun according to the earliest surviving censuses from this region.
Only one Catholic marriage versus almost native unions appears in these remarkable listings written on fig-bark "paper" in Nahuatl by native scribes. These documents display an obsession with fertility, or better infertility, with scribes noting not only the indigeneous names and ages of offspring but also, for each childless couple, the number of years of marriage.
The ancient Nahuas were passionate pronatalists. The Nahua demographic logic can be seen as the triumph of many unconscious population experiments leading to a system of reproduction which worked over the long run. The fate of most small paleopopulations was extinction, or migration, which in the archaeological record looks much the same.
The loss of a reliable water supply, an outbreak of botulism, hemorrhagic fever or life-threatening diarrhea, a lengthy period of sterility or sub-fecundity, an unbalanced sex ratio, the exhaustion of food resources—paleodemographic roulette was unforgiving. Agriculture improved the odds of winning, allowed for greater demographic densities, and led to the emergence of towns, cities, and city-states.
The Malthusian threat was not the inevitable outcome. Although by , demographic densities around Lake Patzcuaro probably exceeded the long-term carrying capacity of the area, in the Central Basin technological innovations, the expansion of highly productive, raised-bed chinampa agriculture, improved grain transport and storage, and even warfare provided relief from the Malthusian menace. From , with the intrusion of European aliens, catastrophe ensued with the death of millions from disease, exploitation, environmental degradation, and, to a much lesser extent, warfare.
How many people lived in "Mexico" central and northern Mesoamerica when Europeans first invaded in ? How large was the ensuing demographic disaster, and what were its principal causes? What were the effects of Spanish conquest and colonization on Mesoamericans, on the quality of life, family, and settlement patterns? What was the demographic legacy of European colonialism?
Then, with independence, did demographic decay set in or was the nineteenth-century a period of accelerated growth? Answers to these questions remain contentious, notwithstanding centuries of research, writing and debate. Now there are signs that consensus is emerging on some of these questions, in turn stimulating new insight and dialogue. There is consensus that the sixteenth-century was a demographic disaster for Mesoamericans. Table 2 displays ten authoritative estimates of population decline for the native population of "Mexico" or diverse parts thereof during the first century of Spanish conquest and colonization.
Estimates of the magnitude of the disaster ranges from less than twenty-five percent to more than ninety. Three schools or interpretations cluster along this broad band of figures: catastrophists, moderates and minimalists. They favor smaller populations at contact million but agree with catastrophists on population totals at nadir Rosenblat sees a decline of the native population from 4. It seems to me that the population of central Mexico at contact must have been no less than the minimalist estimate of four or five million and was likely double and possibly even triple that figure.
The "war over numbers" continues because population estimates prior to , when the first national census was conducted, are unavoidably crude for any large region of the Mexican subcontinent. For the sixteenth-century, the data are dreadfully crude: often derived from gross tax allotments, not actual receipts, or numbers of taxpayers, not total population.
Methods for working these data are more numerical than demographic, and at best the results point to orders of magnitude. The fact remains that most places extant in were never enumerated by either native or colonial authorities. Yet today there survives a surprisingly large corpus of population-like numbers for an exceedingly diverse array of administrative units: hamlets, barrios, subject boroughs, towns, district capitals cabeceras , and provinces. Most native capital "cities," with populations ranging from 10, to a disputed , for the Mexica capital Tenochtitlan, survived the conquest and subsequent demographic catastrophe.
Most natives resided in a dispersed pattern of settlement, to be near corn fields milpas , following the rules of ecology or agronomy rather than political geography. After conquest, successive congregaciones attempted to reduce natives to settlements conducive to Spanish political, economic and religious control. By wherever these efforts were successful, milpa dwellers, formerly clustered near corn fields, were forced into Spanish-style hamlets, villages and towns.
Then, when authorities relaxed their grip, many natives drifted back to the fields. Nevertheless, village settlements in twentieth-century Mexico, with housing clustered around a central plaza, generally reflect colonial rather than prehispanic origins. Sporadic censuses—and there are a few remarkably detailed enumerations from the sixteenth-century that still survive—or tax surveys of small areas capture only a fraction of this movement and are simply inadequate for estimating population totals for large areas.
Baptism and burial registers, which might fill the gap, do not become available in quantity until the late seventeenth-century. The paucity of evidence has spawned much research and controversy. The catastrophist position is best represented by Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, the most tenacious researchers and prolific writers in the field of Mexican population history. Their point estimate of This range takes into account just two of the many sources of variation on which their estimates depend: a spectrum of average family sizes—from 3.
Cook and Borah scoured libraries and archives in Mexico, Spain, and the United States to develop the largest database of colonial population figures extant for "central Mexico," a region of one-half million square kilometers bounded in the north and west by a line connecting Tampico and Tepic and in the south and east by the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.
Relentlessly quantitative, Cook and Borah standardized and converted taxes—from such diverse units as corn, cotton, turkeys, blankets and the like—into tax-payers tributarios , casados , then into total population—with whopping adjustments for tax-exempt classes, tax-free towns, omissions, errors, and lost records.
They concluded that their research documented a demographic catastrophe, "one of the worst in the history of humanity. Their reconstruction is widely accepted, indeed, it has become a paradigm to describe the devastation of European conquests elsewhere in the Americas and Oceania. Sanders and coworkers developed a formidable challenge to catastrophist methodology and conclusions. Their systematic sample of more than 3, archaeological sites in the Valley of Mexico point to contact populations half those proposed by Cook and Borah for the same region, yet it must be noted that the archaeological reconstruction projected to in Table 2 sustains the thesis of enormous demographic disaster for the native population.
A third position is staked out by Angel Rosenblat, who proclaims himself a "moderate," but by my reckoning he is a minimalist. He defends his text-centered reconstruction as follows:. If in fact I did derive moderate and even low figures for the population, it was not because I had intended to do so. The data I had about the Conquest allowed no other choice, unless one were to assume vast and horrible killing, which requires a macabre imagination and which I found unacceptable given the known extermination techniques of the sixteenth-century.
Rosenblat settled on 4. Then too, population densities implied by their figures—at more than inh. The Federal District did not attain the latter until nor the state of Mexico the former until the late s. The catatrophist position is further weakened by a studied refusal to reply to challenges posed by their critics.
In the meantime, it is clear that before the Spanish conquest the population of the Mexican subcontinent was large—certainly five million, probably ten, and perhaps fifteen, if not twenty or twenty-five million. In any case the thesis of demographic disaster does not rest solely on numbers. The many extant narratives provide a sound foundation for a qualitative view of the scale and causes of the calamity.
That the coastal and tropical regions suffered the greatest losses is widely accepted as is the thesis that the highlands had fewer fatalities. Colony-wide losses over the course of the sixteenth-century reached at least one-half, and perhaps as much as nine-tenths over wide areas. Over-work, disruption of the native economy, ecological distress, and forced relocation were much more significant than war in causing the demographic disaster, but disease remains the principal explanation for most historians, just as it was four centuries ago for the first chroniclers.
There is consensus among historians that smallpox struck central Mexico in , the first of a series of devastating, multi-year epidemics that erupted in the sixteenth-century. The epidemic was particularly severe because, unlike in Europe, where the virus was a childhood disease, in Mexico it found "virgin soil," striking entire households, adults as well as children, in one massive blow.
With almost everyone ill at once, there was no one to provide food, water, or care so that many who fell ill died, not of smallpox, but of hunger, dehydration, and despair. Their eye-witness accounts privilege the unadorned facts, without editorial:. In the time of this one, it happened that a great plague came, and then many died of it everywhere in the cities. It was said that it was the smallpox, the great raising of blisters. Never once had this been seen; never had it been suffered in Mexico. Indeed, it smote the faces of everyone, so that pits and roughnesses were formed.
No longer were the dead buried; they could only cast them all into the water—for in those times there was much water everywhere in Mexico. And there was a great, foul odor; the smell issued forth from the dead. Measles hit for the first time in When smallpox returned in and , mortality was lessened because many adults, now immune from having survived an earlier attack, were available to provide care to those who fell ill.
A second great multi-year epidemic struck in cocoliztli , typhus? Although a lively debate continues over which was most severe the German scholar Hans Prem favors the first, that of , it is clear that the effects of each were catastrophic. The founder of New World ethnohistory, Fr. Thirty years later the pestilence which now reigns appeared, and many pueblos were depopulated, and if this business continues, and if it lasts for three or four months, as it now is, no one will remain.
Some catastrophists project these epidemics willy-nilly to encompass the length and breadth of the Americas, but the evidence for such so-called "pandemics" is thin. For example, the smallpox epidemic of is alleged to have raged north to the Great Plains, east to the Atlantic seaboard, west to the Columbia River Basin, and south through Central America down the Andes where, the Inca Huayna Capac died, it is claimed, of smallpox in and beyond. Lesser crises of mumps, influenza, and others vaguely described as "plague" or "sickness" also occurred, often in tandem with famine.
The eighteenth-century chronicler Cayetano Cabrera y Quintero blames higher mortality among the Indians on their poverty—bad nutrition, hunger, cold, and a lack of clothing—, excessive drinking of the native intoxicant pulque , and an intense fatalism in the face of death. He chronicles seventeen major epidemics from to , in addition to the smallpox epidemic of The twentieth-century geographer Peter Gerhard offers an even longer list, noting fourteen outbreaks for the short sixteenth-century, eleven for the seventeenth, and nine for the eighteenth.
In the last century of colonial rule smallpox epidemics erupted every fifteen to twenty years, with enormous loss of life. Then on November 30, , Charles IV ordered a massive vaccination campaign for all the Spanish possessions. The ensuing unprecedented philanthropic odyssey commanded by Francisco Xavier de Balmis carried the vaccine throughout Spanish America and on to the Phillipines.
With independence, intermittent vaccination campaigns greatly reduced mortality, although the disease was not extinguished on Mexican soil for another century and a half. Most historians explain demographic recovery of the native population by means of natural selection or crude Darwinian evolutionism, confusing lifetime immunity with inherited genetic resistance, but there is little evidence to support this claim and much science that negates it. Smallpox mortality was much too low to play a role in human evolution, either after in the Americas or before in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, or even Asia, where it is presumed to have originated.
There is no evidence that humans ever developed genetic resistance to smallpox. Indeed, Europeans, confronting the horrors of the disease, were driven to extraordinary efforts, such as quarantine, inoculation with live virus and ultimately vaccination, to staunch the spread. Genetic diversity characteristic of Old World populations may have provided an advantage, but this thesis remains controversial.
Humans did learn how to provide care to smallpox victims—water to prevent dehydration, food to relieve hunger, blankets to alleviate chill, and soothing words to offer hope—instead of fleeing in horror and abandoning the ill to die untended. In the viceroyalty of New Spain, Native Americans quickly learned how to care for smallpox victims, as is attested in pictures drawn by native artists as early as Mexicans were fortunate because here the disease remained epidemic, recurring at intervals of years, instead of endemic as in London. When smallpox did strike in Mexico, one-in-ten or twenty might die from it, as happened with the epidemic of where in Mexico City alone 12, deaths were attributed to smallpox.
What is remarkable is that four times that number fell ill, received public charity, and recovered. With the succeeding outbreak in , smallpox mortality in the City was halved thanks to timely, systematic, block-by-block, person-to-person care for more than 75, of its residents. Only one in a hundred of the inoculated died. Care was the key in the capital, and prevention in the province. Matlazahuatl typhus?
In the archbishopric of Puebla, for example, almost one-third of the inhabitants died from the disease, according to parish reports compiled by the archbishopric. A recurrence in was preceded by an outbreak of smallpox, and although less severe this crisis still ranked as one of the great terrors of the eighteenth-century. A half century later, in June , while the war for independence raged in central Mexico, the last great typhus epidemic in Mexican history erupted.
Within two months one-tenth of the population of Mexico City died from the disease. By , the epidemic had spread as far north as the Parral mining district in Nueva Viscaya and as far south as Teopisca in Chiapas. Recovery of the native population began, nonetheless, by the middle of the seventeenth-century according to most accounts. Rosenblat places the nadir at 3. Recovery was accompanied by a great mixing of peoples of different ethno-racial backgrounds.
Figure 2 roughs out the evolution of the three principal ethnic stocks—Indian, African and European—and their intermixtures from conquest to the last decade of colonial rule. Indians always made up the overwhelming majority of the population of colonial Mexico, and people of solely African or European origin were always only minor fractions.
The second largest group by the end of the sixteenth-century was the "Euromestizos," that is, Spanish-speakers of mixed Indian and European stock. Within a century of conquest Indo-mestizos mixed stock Indian speakers and Afro-mestizos Spanish-speaking mixed groups with an African component also made up a sizeable fraction of the population. The numbers underlying this graph always add up, but they suggest no more than orders of magnitude.
It seems likely, for example, that the scale of population disaster was less before than after, contrary to what the series implies. Likewise, the notion that the growth of the mixed groups was six-times greater before than after seems improbable. Then in the late eighteenth-century, the apparent ever-accelerating increase of all ethno-racial groups may be more mechanical than demographic—due to improvements in census taking and corrections than to increased growth rates.
For many places this document reports numbers of families—often crudely eye-balled—rather than inhabitants. For example, the town of Guadalajara is reported as containing "eight to nine thousand families of Spaniards, mestizos and mulatos, not counting Indians…. The best colony-wide census was the last, that ordered by the Viceroy Conde de Revillagigedo and the first to use a standard format for listing individuals by name, age, sex, occupation, race, and marital status.
Nevertheless, this effort missed large expanses of New Spain. The German savant Alexander von Humboldt, from his sojourn in the colony, prepared a four volume Essai which revised the Revillagigedo figures to produce a comprehensive set of estimates, adjusted for growth to This is evident in Figure 2 by the identical, steeply sloped curves for all ethno-racial groups from The graph shows that the totals for each group in were computed mechanically. Unfortunately, the royal accountant followed the method favored by Humboldt, estimating growth from parish records by subtracting burials from baptisms.
Neither Navarro y Noriega nor Humboldt paid much heed to the fact that in Mexico baptisms were always more faithfully recorded than burials until the latter decades of the nineteenth-century when civil registration undermined the religious system. Faulty logic convinced Navarro y Noriega that annual growth was 1.
Thus, If historians insist on using these figures, then estimates for earlier and later years would have to be similarly corrected for errors and omissions—a forbidding challenge. In any case, population growth in the closing decades of Spanish rule was much less than Navarro y Noriega, Humboldt or other "triumphalists" of the era surmised.
There were regions of rapid growth in eighteenth-century Mexico. Here population increased five-fold during the eighteenth-century, but part of this growth was due to migration into the region. Then too, there was a noticeable slowing in the final decades of the century, due to successive waves of pestilence and famine. Precisely when elsewhere in America and western Europe population increase was accelerating, in Bourbon Mexico successive calamities condemned the colony to slow demographic growth.
There is consensus that demographic recovery, in addition to growth, meant transformation. Infusions of European and African stocks were slight and predominantly male , as Figure 2 shows. Historians agree that in colonial Mexico racial categorizations were fluid documents usually speak of " calidad " instead of " raza "—character or reputation, instead of race , and that passing was common.
Thus, the rapid growth of the mixed population was a matter of economics and sociology, but demography was also important. Among Europeans and Africans the shortage of females insured much interbreeding, if not intermarriage, with Amerindians. Then too, social identities had their advantages, for undermining as well as upholding the colonial order. The onerous head tax levied solely on Indians encouraged some to abandon the village of birth particularly where land was scarce or made scarce by land-grabbing Spanish-speakers for nearby haciendas or towns and adapt to a non-Indian calidad.
For people of African roots—perhaps , slaves were imported into Mexico over three centuries—, slavery gradually withered away. By the beginning of the eighteenth-century, free labor was too abundant—that is too cheap—for slavery to compete. Then, too, slaves helped destroy slavery, by fleeing, extracting concessions, demanding freedom, taking advantage of civil and church law, and forming communities of free people called mulatos or pardos. Afro-Mexicans with conscious identities based on kinship and community numbered more than one-half million by and "constituted the largest group of free blacks in the Western hemisphere.
Recovery of the native population may be estimated from trends of baptismal series, once parish registers achieve a degree of consistent coverage in the late seventeenth-century. Zachariah Brigden — , chocolate pot, Boston, Massachusetts, ca. Historic Deerfield, Inc.
The house built in by Peter Sargeant was probably the grandest house in Massachusetts in its time and for many years thereafter. In the s, it was remodelled to become the fashionable city home of the colonial governors and became known as the Province House. Portraits of kings, queens, and governors hung in its council chambers, and it symbolized the existing power structure in Boston. It also was the epicenter of the increased urbanization and sophistication that characterized Boston in this period.
Números em texto integral
The Foster-Hutchinson house fig. The Foster-Hutchinson house stood next door to the Clark-Frankland house, built by the merchant William Clark about It, too, was taken down in or This three-story brick mansion was an even more fully developed example of the Georgian style, with its string courses, rhythmic facade, and alternating segmental and triangular pediments. Many less ambitious houses, like the Moses Pierce-Hichborn house of ca. Foster-Hutchinson House, Boston, Massachusetts, — Courtesy of the Trustees of the Boston Public Library.
Chest-on-chest, Boston, Massachusetts, — Black walnut, burl walnut veneer, eastern white pine; h. Desk and bookcase, Boston, Massachusetts, ca. Walnut, walnut veneer, eastern white pine; h. Joseph Richmond Churchill These developments in architecture, in which the Georgian style supplanted the timber-frame first-period buildings of the post-medieval style, started to transform the landscape. They were mirrored in changes in furniture and furnishings that similarly began to affect domestic space. Such objects as the Warland family chest-on-chest fig.
Both are very English in style, and advanced stylistically. Edward S. Cooke, Jr. The chocolate pots bear perhaps the most significant relationship to Boston silver sugar boxes, a similarly small group of ten known examples, including ones by John Coney of ca. Both forms are rare, costly, stylish, and linked to relatively short-lived customs. Although sugar boxes were used primarily in the service of wine, one can imagine a wealthy family using sugar boxes and chocolate pots in the same household, for sugar was also important as a sweetener for the otherwise bitter chocolate.
Edward Winslow — , sugar box, Boston, Massachusetts, ca. Both forms also were produced by only a few craftsmen. Of the combined total of eighteen sugar boxes and chocolate pots, Coney four sugar and two chocolate and Winslow five sugar and two chocolate produced thirteen, or 72 percent; another chocolate pot was made by Peter Oliver, who was probably apprenticed to Coney.
It is possible that Coney and Winslow were able to employ a journeyman with experience in London—perhaps Edward Webb or Henry Hurst—to assist in the fashioning of such stylish, sophisticated forms. Drinking chocolate was both a private and a public custom. Chocolate was taken at coffee-houses, or houses of public entertainment, in a public setting, although because of its higher price due to high duties, chocolate initially took a secondary role to coffee and was soon almost completely eclipsed by the more caffeine-laden drink. In the home, the principal context of silver articles, chocolate was often taken in the morning, at least during the first years after its introduction, but it was undoubtedly used at many times during the day.
The chocolate was poured, in most cases, from silver pots into ceramic chocolate cups, often small, handleless beakers imported from abroad, although smaller tea cups would serve nearly as well. No doubt a variety of drinking vessels were used. Thomas Prince used a porringer. Bostonians obtained their chocolate from local merchants, such as Mrs. Although chocolate contains some theobromine, a mild stimulant, it has more nutritional than stimulating value.
In its early days, chocolate was also thought to have medicinal value and to be an aphrodisiac. Thus, the French cavalier and lady seen taking chocolate in a French print published between and fig. Engraving on paper; h. Pierpont Morgan Library, New York. This theme of enjoyment and relaxation typifies many eighteenth-century images of chocolate drinking. A painting fig.
Dress for taking chocolate was meant to be casual carried to an extreme in this image. Most everything about chocolate drinking suggested ample amounts of leisure time, which is perhaps the greatest symbol of power. Such a style of life—of slow, languorous mornings—was at odds with the Puritan and Yankee modes of behavior, and this divergence may account for the small number of silver chocolate pots made in Massachusetts Bay Certainly the Rev. Prince was not an idle aristocrat—his morning draft of chocolate inaugurated a long day of scholarship and meditation.
Coffee was more in tune with New England Protestantism. Although chocolate remained a part of the culinary landscape throughout the eighteenth century, it was not afforded the exalted status of silver pouring vessels, designed and reserved just for chocolate, with the exception of the two Brigden pots made at midcentury. Other forms became more popular in silver. Based on surviving examples, for example, Massachusetts silversmiths are known to have made at least ninety-five silver teapots before about Most of these, however, were made relatively late.
The earliest is one by John Coney of about and only five others are known that date before By the middle of the s, there was a real spike in the production of teapots, with at least twenty-five known examples, including many by Jacob Hurd, that can be dated to ca. Silver coffeepots were crafted rarely by Massachusetts silversmiths in the first half of the eighteenth century. Only about six made before survive, although at least twenty-one are known dating to the period ca.
Silver coffeepots or pots of other materials may have been used for chocolate after , but the era when it demanded specialization had largely passed. The historian Cary Carson, in a very lengthy study of the style of life in the eighteenth century, has observed that there was something in the air in the years just before and after Certainly people drank chocolate because it tasted good, and wealthy people apparently took pleasure in using silver vessels to do so. The thoughts expressed by William Hughes in , however, probably come closer to the true meaning of chocolate to people of the eighteenth century than do our latter-day theoretical speculations.
In his volume entitled The American Physitian, or. Growing in the English Plantations in America,. It is a very good aliment, a clear Pabulum multi nutriment : that it doth fatten. Particularly helpful for understanding the origins and early history of chocolate are Sophie D. Coe and Michael D. Anthea Bell Cambridge, Mass. Philadelphia: Samuel F. Bradford and Murray, Fairman and Co. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols. Moreover, there appear to be strong secular declines in reports of some ancestries: the proportion of the total American population reporting English ancestry declined from 22 percent in to 13 percent in and to only 9 percent in Brittingham and de la Cruz : 4; Lieberson and Waters : Perhaps the lingering expressions of white ethnicity so attentively researched in the s and s represented the twilight, not the resurgence, of ethnicity Alba Although more than half of white Americans still report a specific national origin, the journey from a deep remembrance of foreign roots to a generalized identity as white American is well underway Jacobson For black Americans, that journey may be nearing completion.
Almost all African Americans have American roots that extend back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Except for a small minority of recent immigrants, ties to the African homeland have been lost to time. While the recent development of biogeographic markers has provided some African Americans with glimpses of their ancestral past, nearly 70 percent of blacks identified themselves simply as black or African American in the census.
Under the weight of one of the most rigid systems of racial hierarchy in modern times, a system born in slavery, sustained by the legacy of the one-drop rule, and cemented with the passage of time, African Americans rarely acknowledge claims of ethnic heritage beyond race. Although counts of persons reporting West Indian and African ancestries are nontrivial in absolute terms, the vast majority of the black population—nearly 90 percent—either report an African American or related ancestry 70 percent or skip the ancestry question altogether 17 percent.
Only about 8. More than one million blacks report various Caribbean ancestries in addition to 1. These reports probably reflect the recent waves of immigration to the United States, as well as the small number of African Americans who may have traced their ancestral lineage using genetic markers. The dominance of Americanized identities is even more evident in the exact wording of the write-in responses. Other terms were much less frequently mentioned. Less than 5 percent identify themselves as black, less than 2 percent as Afro-American, and fewer still as Negro or other terms that once commanded respect among black Americans but no longer do.
It is also of interest that almost no black Americans report any European ancestry. Just as very few white Americans acknowledge any African heritage, most black Americans do not consider their European ancestry to be noteworthy. These trends are suggestive of an underlying process of increasing ethnic entropy—a generalized American identity with diminishing acknowledgment of ancestral complexity.
Only about one-quarter of whites reported a second ancestry in and less than 2 percent of blacks. These figures are lower than in when the ancestry question was first asked in the census Farley Having largely suppressed or lost the memories of their shared ancestry, blacks and whites are also well along the path of forgetting their ancestral places of origin in Africa and Europe.
Skin color does matter, but beyond that, ancestral origins are no longer important for those whites and blacks who are far removed from the immigration experience. The history of Asian settlement in the United States dates back to the mid-nineteenth century Barringer, Gardner, and Levin ; Xie and Goyette Chinese immigrants first arrived in North America in substantial numbers in the s.
Nativist sentiment gradually arrested this process, however, and the influx of Chinese immigrants was essentially halted with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of Saxton Japanese began to arrive in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries following the bar to Chinese immigration. As with the Chinese, Japanese immigrants encountered discrimination and prejudice from white Americans, many of whom were immigrants themselves Daniels In time, immigration from Asia was barred by federal policies, including international agreements, court orders, and restrictive legislation.
With the passage of immigration laws during the s, the national-origins quotas for Asians were set to zero. While the descendants of these early Asian immigrants remain an important part of Asian America, their numbers have been swamped by the much larger influx of Chinese, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Koreans, Vietnamese, and other national-origin groups following the liberalization of immigration in the s Min As observed earlier, the major contemporary shift in racial and ethnic diversity in America is caused by increasing immigration from Asia and Latin America.
Table 6 presents the ethnic composition and the prevalence of multiethnic and multiracial identities for the major Asian-origin groups in Table 7 presents comparable figures for Hispanic-origin populations. Asian populations by single and multiple identities, by foreign birth, and by Hispanicity, Hispanic populations in the United States by national origin, by foreign or native birth, and by percent reporting some other race, The first panel in Table 6 shows the national-origin composition for several definitions of persons who identify themselves as Asian.
This total is composed of 10 million persons who reported a single Asian identity, 0. The second and third groups include persons who could be counted twice under different headings. For example, the sum of the tallies for different Asian groups in the second column exceeds the total number of multiethnic Asian persons. The six largest Asian national-origin groups those listed on the census form account for 87 percent of the One in four Asian Americans is Chinese including Taiwanese.
Filipinos and Asian Indians comprise another 19 percent and 16 percent, respectively. The other three major Asian populations—Koreans, Vietnamese, and Japanese—comprise about 10 percent each of the Total Asian population. A diverse range of other Asian populations is represented among the write-in responses: Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, Pakistani, Thai, Bangladeshi, Indonesian, Sri Lankan, Malaysian, and a catch-all category for smaller Asian groups. None of these groups comprises more than 2 percent of the Total Asian population, and most are much smaller. The vast majority of Asians checked a listed category or wrote in a specific Asian-origin population, but 3 percent simply claimed a panethnic Asian American identity and chose not to identify a specific Asian country or region of origin.
Among the some , multiethnic Asians, one in three is part-Chinese. The Chinese diaspora in many Asian countries has intermarried with other national-origin populations and is well represented in several immigrant streams from Southeast Asia, especially from the Philippines and Vietnam. A significant share of Asian Americans about 1. The panels of Table 6 show the specific characteristics of each national-origin Asian population. The middle panel shows the prevalence of multiethnic and multiracial identities for each group with percentages summed across rows.
The last panel shows two additional characteristics of each national-origin group: the percent foreign-born and the percent Hispanic. The rates of mixed ancestry among Asian Americans are higher than those reported by whites and blacks. Only 82 percent of Asians report themselves to be of a single national origin. More than 90 percent of all Vietnamese are only Vietnamese. This figure drops to the mid percent range for most large Asian groups and even lower for Filipinos and Japanese.
Reports of multiple Asian nationalities i. The much higher report of 23 percent multiethnic composition among the small Malaysian American population undoubtedly reflects the tendency of many Malaysian Chinese to report their ethnicity Chinese and their country of origin Malaysia. Many more Asians report multiple races more than one OMB race category. Most multiracial Asians report having an Asian and a white identity. Roughly 25 percent of Japanese Americans report multiracial ancestry.
This high level of racial blending is due, at least in part, to the fact that most Japanese Americans are descendants of immigrants who arrived in the early twentieth century. Japanese Americans encountered widespread discrimination for much of the century, including internment in detention camps during the US participation in World War II. But in recent decades, Japanese Americans have become economically and spatially integrated with whites, including high rates of intermarriage Espirtu ; Fu ; Xie and Goyette Some 70 percent of Asian Americans in are foreign-born.
The exception to this pattern is Japanese Americans—some 58 percent of Japanese Americans are native-born, mostly the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the immigrant wave of the early twentieth century. When the door to renewed immigration was opened in the late s, Japan was a highly developed country with few factors encouraging emigration.
The modest migration stream from Japan at present is more akin to the circulation of highly skilled professionals and business managers among industrial countries than the immigration influx from other Asian countries. A small minority of Asians, about ,, checked the Asian American category but did not report a specific national origin. This Americanized panethnic population is largely native-born 55 percent and has an unusually high proportion 55 percent reporting multiracial ancestry. This group also has higher overlap with Hispanics 5 percent than do other Asians 0.
Filipinos, who account for 1 of every 5 Asians in the United States, are only slightly less multiracial 19 percent than the Japanese 26 percent. Among the six major Asian populations, only the Vietnamese are less than 10 percent multiracial. Hispanics share many parallels with Asian Americans.
Immigration for both groups is the main force behind their rapid population growth in recent decades. In addition, national origins, rather than American racial categories, are the primary source of ethnic identity for Hispanics. As shown in Figure 1 , the census question on Hispanic origin lists Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban as separate checkboxes.
Table 7 includes the three listed Hispanic groups and the 20 largest write-in groups, organized in terms of region: Central America, South America, and Other Hispanic. The total number for each Hispanic population is reported in the first column in Table 7. The second and third columns show each Hispanic group as a percentage of the national US population and of the Total any Hispanic population. The census Hispanic-origin question does not allow multiple responses, so respondents are forced to select only one of the mutually exclusive categories.
Because nativity is a defining characteristic of the Hispanic population, the next two columns show the national-origin composition of foreign-born and native-born Hispanics. These attributes are row percentages. In , nearly 13 percent of Americans The Mexican-origin population also outnumbers every white ancestry group except for German Americans see Table 5.
Nearly three-fourths of all Hispanics identify themselves with the three major Hispanic communities: 60 percent as Mexican, 10 percent as Puerto Rican, and 4 percent as Cuban. The balance 27 percent of all Hispanics represents a diverse group of national- and regional-origin populations. Some 5 percent have origins in various Central American countries, and another 4 percent have South American origins.
The largest groups are Salvadorans , and Colombians , The largest group among other Hispanics are Dominicans , The only non—Latin American population listed under Hispanics is Spaniards, who number just , Each of these Central and South American origin groups, however, is dwarfed by the 5.
Second only to Mexicans in size, this large, panethnic group outnumbers Latinos from every South and Central American nation combined, and unlike most Latino-origin groups, panethnic Hispanics are predominantly 70 percent native-born. Although a majority of Hispanics, 55 percent, are native-born, this average masks the wide variation among the peoples of Hispanic origin. Regardless of birthplace, all Puerto Ricans are US citizens; moreover, about 3 in 5 are mainland-born.
Even though the majority of Mexican Americans are native-born, the Mexican-born population is the largest component of foreign-born Hispanics 56 percent. On the other hand, Cubans, Dominicans, and those who report specific Central and South American national origins are predominantly—upwards of 70 percent—foreign-born. As noted earlier, the 5. In , nearly half of all Hispanics 48 percent supplied an SOR response alone or in combination to the race question.
Of the three major groups, only Cubans show a small minority 1 in 10 selecting SOR the majority chose white. Of the Central and South American groups, the latter are generally less likely to identify as SOR 38 percent on average. Statistics not shown in Table 7 indicate that most South American groups opt for white identity about 60 percent of the time, particularly Argentineans 81 percent , Chileans 70 percent , Uruguayans 81 percent , and Venezuelans 71 percent.
Only trivial numbers of Hispanics select any racial identity other than SOR or white. Less than 2 percent of Hispanics claim a black racial identity, and with the exception of Panamanians 26 percent black , no group has a double-digit percentage of blacks.
Further, a significant number of persons with partial Hispanic ancestry may no longer claim Hispanic identity Duncan and Trejo , Among those who do identify themselves as Hispanic, their rejection of American racial categories in nearly half the cases poses a major challenge to the present system of classification. One interpretation is that Hispanic immigrants are simply unfamiliar with American racial typologies. Another possibility is that Hispanics perceive that the American racial system creates hierarchy and stigmatization, and they choose to ground their identities in national origins and cultures Landale and Oropesa Because of space limitations and the complexity of their ancestry, our analysis of the racial and ethnic identities of AIAN and NHOPI populations is presented in a companion paper available on request from the authors.
By the close of the nineteenth century, many Native American tribes had been driven to the brink of extinction by conquest, forced migration, and genocidal policies Thornton ; Snipp A slow demographic revival among indigenous peoples has accelerated over the last half-century. In the census, 2. This dramatic comeback, in part the result of natural increase, is primarily attributable to shifts in identities among persons with partial American Indian ancestry Harris ; Eschbach , ; Ogunwole About 1 in 5 persons checked the Pacific Islander racial category but did not write in a specific ancestral population.
The disparate and at times jumbled patterns of racial and ethnic reporting in the US census result from a conceptual quagmire. The heart of the issue is a sharp divergence between the geographic definition of ancestry envisioned by the framers of the current classification system, and the de facto measures of race and ethnicity based on subjective, socially constructed identities. The expansion of the census race question to include many national-origin groups from Asia, but none from Europe, is an artifact of ideology and politics.
The addition of the ancestry question in was motivated, at least in part, by the political preferences of white Americans who wanted to measure their ethnic roots. The impact of politics on the American census, including the measurement of race and ethnicity, is not a recent phenomenon. From the first census in to the present, political forces have been closely intertwined with census taking Anderson However, the observations that the racial and ethnic categories in the census are shaped by political considerations and that the responses are not always accurate measures of ancestral origins do not mean that the data are without value.
Racial and ethnic responses provide a good reading of contemporary social and political identities, even if the mix of influences stemming from ancestral origins and other factors may vary.
Examination of racial and ethnic identities by age, birthplace, and other characteristics allows us to detect systematic patterns of how social divisions are constructed and perceived. Both measurement problems are minimized by treating Hispanicity on par with the standard OMB racial categories. Mexican in response to the census race question Logan ; Perez Immigration and generational succession are the primary forces changing the ethnic composition of the American population.
The influx of newcomers from Latin America and Asia in recent decades, combined with modest differences in natural increase, has led to a much lower proportion of non-Hispanic whites, particularly among young adults and children. Not all diversity, however, is of foreign origins. Native Americans, and to a lesser extent African Americans, have the longest history of residence in North America.
Moreover, many Mexican Americans and most of the panethnic Hispanic population have long historical roots in the country. The majority of Puerto Ricans residing in the 50 states are mainland-born. Unless there is a new immigration wave from Cuba, generational succession will lead to a predominately native-born Cuban American population in the coming decades. The addition of the census ancestry question in , conceived as an effort to highlight white ancestral origins, has in large part chronicled the opposite—partly in the form of blended ancestries, and more recently through the apparent and ongoing disappearance of ethnic consciousness from large segments of the American population.
While these patterns may be interpreted as a failure of measurement, we suggest that the evidence is consistent with a model of Americanized panethnic identities that minimizes ancestral diversity. The Americanization of racial and ethnic origins is evident for all long-resident groups. With only a small fraction of recent immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean, and ancestral roots dating back over years, the geographic origins of most African Americans are not part of the popular consciousness.
Most African Americans simply reiterate their Americanized racial identity to the open-ended ancestry question. European national origins are still common among whites—almost 3 of 5 whites name one or more European countries in response to the ancestry question. The ancestral roots of the grandchildren or great-grandchildren of immigrants are still part of living memories.
Ethnicity is receding from the consciousness of many white Americans. Because national origins do not count for very much in contemporary America, many whites are content with a simplified Americanized racial identity. The loss of specific ancestral attachments among many white Americans also results from high patterns of intermarriage and ethnic blending among whites of different European stocks. Ethnic blending between whites, blacks, and American Indians occurred in the centuries before and after the founding of the United States.
Yet the racial responses to Census provide almost no acknowledgment of a substantial extent of shared ancestry between black and white Americans. Only a powerful racial ideology, exemplified by the one-drop rule and backed by state-sanctioned discrimination, made it possible to create the fiction of separate origins.
Undoubtedly this pattern persists in part because biologically discrete races are not, and have never been, a precondition for racial prejudice or inequality. As a result, even as persons of mixed descent are increasingly represented in popular culture, politics, and advertising campaigns, there are few signs that these changes have led to a shift in the patterns of reporting on race and ethnicity among blacks and whites. While this difference reflects contemporary patterns of intermarriage, deeper forces are undoubtedly at work.
Historically, antipathy and bigotry toward all American minorities were commonplace, including the savage wars to wrest control of the lands of American Indians, the campaigns to deny citizenship and other basic rights to Asians, and the economic and political exploitation of the peoples of Mexican origin in Texas and elsewhere. As these patterns have receded in recent decades, there have been increases in residential integration, economic mobility, and intermarriage among many American Indians, Asians, and Latinos with whites.
There has been much less integration and intermarriage of blacks with whites. As noted above, immigration from Latin America and Asia is the major force changing the racial and ethnic composition of the American population. Two patterns are evident from Census The first is that most Hispanic and Asian Americans identify themselves with specific national origins. This pattern is facilitated by the inclusion of Asian nationalities Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, etc. Both questions also include a write-in option allowing other national and regional groups to specify their exact origins.
This pattern of response is reinforced by the high percentage of first- and second-generation immigrants among Asian and Hispanic Americans, for whom there are active memories of a specific homeland. In some ways, these homeland attachments are similar to those of Eastern and Southern Europeans a century ago. The descendants of these immigrants eventually blended into the mainstream white population, but this was not the outcome expected or desired by old-stock Americans who erected the immigration barriers in the s to keep out undesirable Eastern and Southern Europeans Higham While national origins remain the primary mode of identification, there are tentative signs of emerging Americanized identities among Hispanics and Asians.
The panethnic Hispanic population is the second largest Hispanic group and is largely native-born. The panethnic Asian American respondents are a proportionately smaller fraction of all Asians, but this probably reflects the recent timing of the immigration stream. Persons who claim to be simply Asian American are disproportionately native-born and of multiracial origin. High levels of intermarriage among both Asians and Latinos, especially in the second generation, weaken ethnic ties and attachments Stevens and Tyler ; Duncan and Trejo , In most US censuses and surveys, an adult respondent, typically a parent, reports on the race and ancestry of children in the household.
There is wide variation in the response patterns, with some evidence of a slight preference among some groups for assigning a white identity to children with one Asian parent and one white parent Saenz, Hwang, and Anderson ; Xie and Goyette ; Waters The census allowed intermarried parents to report multiple identities for their mixed-race children, but as multiracial children grow to adulthood, they are likely to choose less complex identities than those reported by their families of origin. The choice of a marriage partner and the community of residence may have decisive influences on the identity choices of persons of mixed ancestry.
They might well gravitate to one community or the other, or perhaps simply grow less interested in recording the complexity of their ancestry. Racial and ethnic identities can shift, especially with the very high levels of intermarriage of Hispanics and Asians with whites. In addition to immigration, the future race and ethnic composition of the United States will be shaped by ethnic blending and patterns of identity choices. New categories may emerge for persons of mixed ancestry. God is making the American.
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The melting pot metaphor is not always viewed in such optimistic terms. Some see the concept as fanciful or incomplete, while others view the melting pot as a self-serving smoke screen for the stratified nature of American society. The persistence of racial and ethnic segregation and inequality belies any claims that race and ethnicity have disappeared into some crucible of American idealism. Yet considerable evidence suggests that the divisions between groups of European ancestry have been eroded through intermarriage over the course of the twentieth century Alba and Nee The highly blended ancestries reported by many American Indians, Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders are also more in line with the melting pot metaphor than with the one-drop ideology that divides white and black America.
In the current era of high immigration, the emergence of Americanized and admixed identities may be deferred because new arrivals outnumber the second and third generations for some groups. Yet it seems inevitable that ancestral ties will weaken with the passage of time. This pattern would be most likely if political, social, and economic sanctions or incentives reinforce group solidarity. But, should ethnic or racial identities lose their political and economic salience, or if intermarriage should continue to blur group boundaries, the reporting of ancestral roots will likely become more flexible, symbolic, and situational.
Just as the forces of increasing ethnic entropy have led to the disappearance of ancestral roots within Americanized panethnic groups, the boundaries between and within other groups may also begin to erode. Contact Anthony Daniel Perez at ude. We are indebted to Matthew Snipp for his careful reading and comments on an earlier draft. Palmer, Nikolas D. These data are produced and distributed by the Minnesota Population Center Ruggles et al. All of the tables in this article are based on our analysis of data from the IPUMS archive, but we occasionally reference census data from other sources such as the Census summary files.
In Table 3 , we count everyone born outside the 50 states and the District of Columbia as foreign-born, even those who were American citizens already at birth, because they have had a migration-like experience when moving from Puerto Rico or American Samoa. Although this emphasis was removed in and later censuses, it is unclear whether responses reflect objective information about ancestral origins or contemporary identity preferences, a confusion echoed by the census's vague and deliberately broad definition of the term US Census Bureau These intercensal estimates are nearly identical to those from the American Community Survey National Center for Biotechnology Information , U.
Popul Dev Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC Jun 9. Anthony Daniel Perez and Charles Hirschman. Copyright and License information Disclaimer. Copyright notice. See other articles in PMC that cite the published article. How race and ethnicity are measured Relative to other topics in the decennial census, race and ethnicity comprise a large portion of the questionnaire.
Open in a separate window. Theoretical perspectives on ancestry and identity That race and ethnicity are socially constructed is one of the axioms of contemporary social science Omi ; Omi and Winant Exponential growth of ancestral tree, assuming mean generation length of 25 years. Patterns of racial and ethnic diversity in Census Table 1 shows the reported racial composition for the total population and for Hispanics in the census.
The color line: America in black and white Even against the backdrop of an increasingly broad spectrum of racial and ethnic diversity, American race relations continue to pivot on the historical divide between white and black America. Asians and Hispanics: The new immigrant populations The history of Asian settlement in the United States dates back to the mid-nineteenth century Barringer, Gardner, and Levin ; Xie and Goyette Multiethnic Asian and Multiracial Asian tallies can exceed the number of persons because respondents are double counted.
Chinese alone. TABLE 7 Hispanic populations in the United States by national origin, by foreign or native birth, and by percent reporting some other race, Conclusions The disparate and at times jumbled patterns of racial and ethnic reporting in the US census result from a conceptual quagmire. References Alba Richard. Ethnic Identity. Yale University Press; New Haven: Immigration and the American realities of assimilation and multiculturalism.
Sociological Forum. Counting by race: The Antebellum legacy. Russell Sage Foundation; New York: Who Counts? Vintage Books; New York: Asian and Pacific Islanders in the United States. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Little, Brown, and Company; Boston: The politicization of changing terms of self-reference among American slave descendants. American Speech. America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity.
The Hispanic Population of the United States. The Changing Terrain of Race and Ethnicity. Show Boat: The revival, the racism. The Drama Review.
Ancestry: , Census Brief. Little, Brown and Company; New York: Categorical imperatives: Interaction of Latino and racial identification. Social Science Quarterly. Thinking outside the Black box: Measuring Black and multiracial identification in surveys. Social Science Research. Perseus Books; Cambridge, MA: In: Thernstrom Stephan. The Politics of Prejudice. Atheneum; New York: A family get-together of historic proportions. New York Times. Who Is Black?